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Abstract—We propose a novel attack that compromises the
physical layer security of downlink (DL) communications in
wireless systems. This technique is based on the transmission
of a slowly-varying random symbol by the eavesdropper during
its uplink transmission, so that the equivalent fading channel
observed at the base station (BS) has a larger variance. Then, the
BS designs the secure DL transmission under the assumption that
the eavesdropper’s channel experiences a larger fading severity
than in reality. We show that this approach can lead the BS
to transmit to Bob at a rate larger than the secrecy capacity,
thus compromising the system secure operation. Our analytical
results, corroborated by simulations, show that the use of multiple
antennas at the BS may partially alleviate but not immunize
against these type of attacks.
Index Terms—Attacks, fading, physical layer security, secrecy
capacity, wireless security.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, the research on wireless secu-
rity has experienced a paradigm-shift due to the advent of
physical layer security (PLS) techniques. Even though the
broadcast nature of wireless transmission could be thought to
be detrimental for security, the seminal works in [1, 2] paved
the way to leverage the random nature of wireless channels
to provide information-theoretic security to communications
in the presence of eavesdroppers. Similarly to conventional
techniques for security provision in higher layers, PLS in
wireless environments is also sensitive to attacks, with the
ultimate goal of precluding a secure communication between
the legitimate peers Alice and Bob.
In addition to malicious jamming [3], which affects the
ability of Alice to acquire the channel state information (CSI)
from Bob (thus degrading the achievable secure rate), there are
other approaches proposed in the literature to perform attacks
from a PLS perspective. For instance, in massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) contexts, a pilot-contamination
attack can be used to influence the base station’s beamforming
design [4]. In this strategy, usually referred to as pilot spoofing
[5], an eavesdropper (Eve) transmits the same pilot sequence
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as Bob’s during the uplink training phase, in a perfectly
synchronized fashion. By doing so, the equivalent channel
for the eavesdropper improves as the number of antennas
is increased, which causes the secrecy capacity not to be
increased as the number of antennas grows.
In this work, we propose a new type of attack aimed at com-
promising the physical layer security in scenarios on which
the potential eavesdroppers are system agents; this is the case,
for instance, of wireless communication systems served by a
base station (BS). In our scheme, the eavesdropper designs its
uplink (UL) transmission in a way that the equivalent channel
observed by the BS is the product1 of the actual fading and
a slowly-varying random sequence – i.e, a synthetic fading
coefficient. By doing so, the BS designs its downlink (DL)
transmission to the legitimate user under the premise that
the eavesdropper experiences a more severe fading than the
actual one, thus choosing a secrecy rate larger than the true
secrecy capacity. The efectiveness of this technique is verified
both theoretically and by simulation, showing that multiple
antennas at the BS does not suffice to improve robustness
against the attack.
This strategy differs from the random beamforming or
artificial fast fading scheme in [6] in several aspects: (a) our
scheme is intended to operate in scenarios on which Eve is
a part of the system, so that Eve’s CSI is available at Alice;
(b) we implement the artificial slow fading technique at the
eavesdropper’s side, aiming to deceive Alice into assuming
that Eve’s channel has a larger variance; (c) the artificial fast
fading proposed in [6] changes at a faster rate that the actual
fading channel, so that Eve is unable to estimate the CSI; in
our case, the synthetic fading generated by Eve changes at the
same rate as the actual fading, so that Alice cannot separate
the effects of both sources of randomness.
The remainder of this letter is organized as follows. The
system model under analysis is described in Section II, and the
product channel attack technique is described in Section III.
The derivation of the relevant secrecy metrics are carried out
in Section IV. Performance results are evaluated and discussed
in Section V. Finally, we draw the main conclusions in Section
VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us assume a wireless communication system where a
BS transmits information to a set of users V on its coverage
area. Without loss of generality, we consider that the BS is
1Hence, we propose the term product channel attack to denote this
technique.
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2equipped with M antennas whereas users are equipped with
single-antenna devices. We assume that the system operates
on a time-division duplexing (TDD) mode, so that CSI for
each user can be estimated during the UL transmission phase.
We consider that all radio channels are subject to independent
quasi-static Rayleigh fading, and remain constant along the
transmission of each codeword.
The BS operates in two modes for DL transmission, referred
to as standard and secure modes. Under standard operation,
the BS beamforms a set of messages zv with E{|zv|2} = 1
and v ∈ V to each intended user through a maximal ratio
transmission (MRT) scheme [7]. Under secure operation, the
BS wishes to establish a secure communication with a legiti-
mate user vi = B, now assuming that a (different) illegitimate
user vj = E aims to eavesdrop the communication.
During the UL phase, the signal received by the BS at the
i-th receive antenna can be expressed as:
y(i)u =
√
PuLuxuh
(i)
u + n
(i), (1)
where now u = {B,E} is used to denote the parameters
corresponding to the transmission from the legitimate (B) or
eavesdropper (E) users, respectively. The transmitted symbols
xu are normalized so that E{|xu|2} = 1; Pu represents the
transmission power for user u; Lu is the path loss measured
at a reference distance Ru, computed as R−αu , where α is
the path-loss exponent; and the channel coefficients h(i)u are
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
E{|h(i)u |2} = 1. Finally, n(i) represents the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) samples at the i-th receive antenna.
We assume that the BS is able to perfectly estimate all the
channel coefficients h(i)u , in order to recover the UL messages,
as well as to use such CSI to design the DL transmission.
During the DL transmission in secure mode, the BS beam-
forms the message zB with E{|zB|2} = 1 through a MRT
scheme [7]. In this case, the beamforming vector wB ∈ CM×1
is adapted to Bob’s instantaneous channel; using the notation
in [8], we have wHB =
hHB
||hB|| =
[h
(1)
B ,...,h
(M)
B ]
∗√∑M
i=1 |h(i)B |2
, where H
denotes the Hermitian transpose and hB ∈ CM×1 is the vector
representation of the legitimate channel. Therefore, assuming
a transmission power PT for the BS, the signal received at Bob
from the BS in the DL transmission after the MRT processing
is given by
yMRTB =
√
PTR
−α
B h
H
BwB︸ ︷︷ ︸
heqB
zB + nB, (2)
whereas the signal received at the eavesdropper is given by
yMRTE =
√
PTR
−α
E h
H
EwB︸ ︷︷ ︸
heqE
zB + nE, (3)
where nB and nE are the AWGN noise components at each
receiver, with E{|nu|2} = N0. In (2) and (3), the signal
arriving at each receiver is affected by an equivalent scalar
channel denoted as heqB and h
eq
E , respectively. Thanks to the
MRT scheme, |heqB |2 is Gamma distributed with scale and
shape parameters M and M , respectively, whereas |heqE |2 is
exponentially distributed with unitary mean [9].
Hence, the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)s at the
legitimate and eavesdropper’s sides can be expressed as
γB =
PTR
−α
B
N0
|heqB |2|zB|2 (4)
and
γE =
PTR
−α
E
N0
|heqE |2|zB|2, (5)
with average SNRs γB = E {γB} = MPTR
−α
B
N0
= Mγ0, being
γ0 the average SNR in the case of a single-antenna transmitter
and γE = E {γE} = PTR
−α
E
N0
. Note that γE is not influenced
by the number of antennas M since the beamforming vector
wB is not adapted to Eve’s instantaneous channel.
III. THE PRODUCT CHANNEL ATTACK
As previously indicated, the BS designs its DL transmission
using a MRT scheme for each user, using the CSI acquired in
the UL phase. We consider that the BS transmit with constant
power, and adapts the rate and coding schemes for each user
in order to operate close to capacity (in standard mode), or to
secrecy capacity (in secure mode). Because the BS has perfect
CSI for every user in the system (including the eavesdropper
E, or Eve), it is feasible to adapt the wiretap coding scheme to
every realization of the fading channels. As indicated in [1],
any average secrecy rate below the average secrecy capacity
is achievable. Hence, the secure performance is captured by
the average secrecy capacity (ASC) of the link between the
legitimate peers (the BS, which plays the role of Alice, and
Bob) in the presence of an eavesdopper E, defined as
CS = E{CS (γB, γE)}, (6)
where γB and γE denote the instantaneous SNRs at Bob and
Eve, respectively, and CS (γB, γE) is the instantaneous secrecy
capacity defined as
CS(γB, γE) =
γB>γE
log2(1 + γB)− log(1 + γE). (7)
The physical layer security attack proposed in this work is
formulated as follows: let us assume that during the UL phase
the eavesdropper transmits a modified symbol x˜E = xE · θE
with E{|x˜E|2} = 1. The synthetic variable θE is generated so
that it varies at the same rate as the actual fading channel, and
multiplies Eve’s UL transmission symbols and pilot sequences.
In this situation, the CSI information acquired by the BS is
modified as follows: the CSI estimated by the BS in the UL
for Eve is now hˆE = θEhE, whereas Bob’s channel estimation
(and hence the beamforming design) remains unaltered. Thus,
the BS is deceived into thinking that the equivalent channel
observed by E after MRT is now
hˆeqE = hˆ
H
EwB = θ
∗
Eh
H
EwB = θ
∗
Eh
eq
E , (8)
so that Eve’s instantaneous SNR estimation available at the BS
becomes γˆE = |θE|2γE. However, the average SNR estimated
by the BS is not modified with respect to the case on which
the attack is not performed, i.e. γˆE = E {γˆE} = γE. Note that
the average SNR is chiefly determined by the path loss due
to the distance between each user and the BS, which can also
3Alice
γˆE = γE · |θE |2
Bob
Eve
M
γB
γE
γˆB = γB
γˆE 6= γE
Fig. 1. CSI availability at the BS (Alice) for the system model under
consideration. For simplicity, only the users of interest are represented.
be determined through timing alignment strategies. Thus, the
eavesdopper avoids the risk that the BS detects an abnormal
variation in the average SNR estimated from this user. With
all the above considerations, the overall CSI availability at the
BS can be summarized as in Fig. 1.
Now, the transmission rate from A to B is decided by A
based on the SNRs γˆB and γˆE, and the latter differs from the
actual SNRs at Eve due to the fact that the attack does not
affect the legitimate channel. With the CSI availability at A,
the transmission rate towards B is then designed to maximize
the following metric:
RS(γB, γˆE) =
γB>γˆE
CB(γB)− CˆE(γˆE)
=
γB>γˆE
log2(1 + γB)− log(1 + γˆE) > 0. (9)
From the BS perspective, the metric RS corresponds to the
secrecy capacity of the legitimate link. However, comparing
(7) and (9) it is evident that such rate does not coincide with
the secrecy capacity; in the following, we will refer to RS
as compromised secrecy rate. Using the definition in (9), the
average compromised secrecy rate can be computed as
RS = E{RS (γB, γˆE)}. (10)
Now, when the average SNR at Bob is sufficiently large, the
average secrecy capacity is tightly approximated by [10]
CS ≈
γB→∞
E{CB (γB)} − E{CE (γE)}, (11)
and hence, we also have that
RS ≈
γB→∞
E{CB (γB)} − E{CˆE (γˆE)}. (12)
Because the equivalent channel hˆeqE has a larger variance that
heqE , then E{CE (γE)} > E{CˆE (γˆE)} and hence RS > CS.
Thus, when the BS considers that E is experiencing a larger
fading severity than the actual one, then A is deceived into
assuming that the eavesdropper channel has a lower capacity
than in reality. This causes that the BS can select a rate RS
that exceeds the secrecy capacity, which compromises physical
layer security.
IV. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
We now provide analytical expressions to give mathematical
support to the performance degradation due to the proposed
attack. We use the formulation of the average secrecy capacity
introduced in [10, eq. (29)]:
CS(γB, γE) = CB(γB)− L (γB, γE) , (13)
where CB(γB) = E{CB (γB)} is the average capacity of the
legitimate link, and the term L (γB, γE) ≥ 0 can be regarded
as an average secrecy capacity loss, defined as [10, eq. (30)]:
L (γB, γE) ,
1
log 2
∫ ∞
0
FE(x)FB(x)
1 + x
dx, (14)
where FB(·) and FE(·) represent the complementary cumula-
tive distribution function (cCDF) of γB and γE, respectively,
and log denotes the natural logarithm. As discussed in Section
II, the legitimate SNR γB is Gamma distributed with scale
parameter γB and shape parameter M :
FB(x) = e
−MxγB
M−1∑
n=0
(
Mx
γB
)n
1
n!
(15)
and γE is exponentially distributed with average γE. Using the
cCDF of the Gamma distribution, the true secrecy capacity in
(13) can be evaluated as
CB (γB) =
1
log 2
e
M
γB
M−1∑
n=0
En+1
(
M
γB
)
, (16)
where Em(·) is the generalized Exponential Integral, and
L (γB, γE) = e
M
γB
+ 1
γE
log 2
M−1∑
n=0
(
M
γB
)n
Γ
(
−n, MγB +
1
γE
)
, (17)
using the same procedure as in [11], where Γ(·, ·) is the upper
incomplete Gamma function.
Analogously, the average compromised secrecy rate can be
defined as:
RS(γB, γˆE) = CB(γB)− Lˆ (γB, γE) (18)
where now Lˆ (γB, γE) is given by
Lˆ (γB, γE) ,
1
log 2
∫ ∞
0
F Eˆ(x)FB(x)
1 + x
dx, (19)
and F Eˆ(·) represents the cCDF of γˆE. With these definitions,
the condition for a successful attack (i.e., making A transmit
at a larger rate than CS) is given by
D(bps/Hz) , L (γB, γE)− Lˆ (γB, γE) > 0, (20)
which is measured in excess of bps/Hz.
The distribution of γˆE is that of a composite random variable
(RV) built as γˆE = |θE|2γE, and its cCDF can be computed
as
F Eˆ(z) =
∫ ∞
0
FE
(
z
y
)
fy (y) dy, (21)
where fy (y) is the probability density function (PDF) of the
variable y = |θE|2. We will now exemplify how the choice
of the distribution of the synthetic symbol θE impacts the
physical layer security performance.
Let us first consider that |θE| is drawn from a Rayleigh
distribution, similar to the fading channel under consideration.
4Hence, the power random variable y = |θE|2 follows an
exponential distribution with unitary power. The cCDF of γˆE
is therefore a special case of the distribution of the product of
two Gamma random variables [12]:
F
Ray
Eˆ (z) = 2
√
z
γE
K1
(√
4z
γE
)
, (22)
where K1(·) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind
and first order. Plugging (22) and (15) and the well-known
expression of the Gamma distribution into (19) and (18), the
average compromised secrecy rate is obtained using (16) as
LˆRay (γB, γE) ,
1
log 2
∫ ∞
0
F
Ray
Eˆ (x)FB(x)
1 + x
dx, (23)
which can be easily evaluated numerically with standard
mathematical packages.
Taking a deeper look into the assumption of |θE| to be
Rayleigh distributed, it could be argued that such choice would
require an arbitrary instantaneous power budget at Eve’s side
because of the semi-infinite support for the domain of the
RV |θE|. Hence, we also consider the case on which |θE|
is drawn from an uniform distribution. In this situation, the
power constraint E{|θE|2} = 1 is translated into a support for
the RV given by |θE| ∈ [0,
√
3]. Integrating the exponential
distribution over the support of |θE| using (21) yields
F
Uni
Eˆ (z) = e
− z3γE −
√
zpi
3γE
erfc
(√
z
3γE
)
, (24)
where erfc(·) is the complementary error function. Hence, we
can compute the ASC loss in this case as
LˆUni (γB, γE) ,
1
log 2
∫ ∞
0
F
Uni
Eˆ (x)FB(x)
1 + x
dx, (25)
respectively. Again, this ASC loss metric can be evaluated with
accuracy using standard numerical integration routines. Alter-
natively, exponential-like approximations to the erfc function
can be used to obtain approximate expressions for the ASC
loss in a similar functional form as that in (17).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now evaluate the performance metrics introduced in the
previous section for a number of scenarios of interest. In all
instances, Monte Carlo (MC) simulations have been included
to double-check the validity of the analytical results.
In Fig. 2, the average secrecy capacity and the average
compromised secrecy rate are evaluated for different antenna
configurations. The eavesdropper’s SNR is set to γE = 5dB,
and the synthetic symbol |θE| is drawn from a Rayleigh
distribution. We observe that in all instances the compromised
secrecy rate RS, which is the secrecy metric available at
Alice after the attack to design the DL transmission, exceeds
the true secrecy capacity CS. Hence, any transmission rate
within the gray-shaded area is sensitive to be decoded by the
eavesdropper.
In Fig. 3, we now represent the average secrecy capacity and
the average compromised secrecy rate for different values of
γE. A multi-antenna transmitter with M = 4 and a synthetic
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Fig. 2. Average secrecy capacity (CS) vs. average compromised rate (RS)
as a function of γ0, with γE = 5 dB and M = 1, 2, 4, 8. Markers correspond
to MC simulations.
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Fig. 3. Average secrecy capacity (CS) vs. average compromised rate (RS) as
a function of γ0, with M = 4 and γE = {5, 10, 15} dB. Markers correspond
to MC simulations.
symbol |θE| now drawn from a uniform distribution are con-
sidered. We see that the difference between the compromised
secrecy rate RS and the true secrecy capacity CS grows as
γE is increased. Hence, for a given system set-up, the attack
is more harmful as Eve is closer to Alice.
Finally, in Fig. 4 we evaluate the metric D in (20), which
captures the difference between the compromised secrecy
rate RS and the true secrecy capacity CS. In this case, the
x-axis now corresponds to the average SNR at Bob, i.e.
γB(dB) = γ0(dB) + 10 log10M . Hence, this means that in
order to achieve a target γB at Bob, the transmit power can
be decreased by a factor of M compared to the case of using
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Fig. 4. Excess secrecy rate D as a function of γB, for different numbers of
antennas and different distributions for the synthetic symbol θE; γE = 15 dB
for M = 1 and then reduced by 10 log10M (dB).
a single antenna2. In other words, setting a fixed value of
γB ideally makes γE to be decreased by a factor of M . We
can extract several important insights from the observation
of Fig. 4: (i) the use of a uniformly distributed synthetic
symbol seems the better choice from the perspective of the
eavesdropper, as it can be generated in an easier form while
at the same time allowing for a larger average compromised
secrecy rate; (ii) the use of a larger number of antennas at Alice
allows for reducing D for high SNR at Bob, chiefly because
of the effective reduction in γE for a fixed γB; however,
as previously discussed the scaling of γB with M does not
hold when the size of the antenna array grows [13]. This
implies that the excess secrecy rate D cannot be eliminated in
practice by letting M →∞; (iii) we see that in the low-SNR
regime, increasing the number of antennas at Alice is actually
detrimental since the excess secrecy rate grows in this region
with M ; finally, (iv) as γB is increased the excess secrecy
rate D saturates, so that no benefit is obtained by moving the
legitimate user closer to Alice in terms of reducing D. This
behavior is well-explained by (11) and (12), which make D
to depend only on the distribution of Eve’s channel, i.e.
D ≈
γB→∞
CE − CˆE, (26)
where CE and CˆE are the average capacity and the average
rate estimated by Alice for Eve’s link, respectively.
With all the previous considerations, we see that for a fixed
system set-up, i.e. a given number of antennas at Alice, a fixed
power budget PT and a certain distance for the users acting as
legitimate and eavesdropper agents RB and RE, the average
compromised secrecy rate will always exceed the true secrecy
capacity under this type of attack.
2We note that the scaling of γB with M does not hold in practice for
arbitrarily large M . Hence, while it is useful to analyze the behavior of
antenna arrays in practice, it should not be used for asymptotic purposes
as M →∞ [13].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a new type of attack against wireless phys-
ical layer security, that could affect secrecy performance in
scenarios where one of the system agents acts as a potential
eavesdropper. The generation by the eavesdropper on the UL
phase of a synthetic symbol that varies at the same rate
as the channel fading coefficients is shown to deceive the
legitimate transmitter into selecting a secrecy rate that exceeds
the secrecy capacity.
Since the attack becomes more effective as γE grows, the
use of secure areas in the proximity of Alice could help to
partially mitigate the attack. Apart from this, the only choice
for the BS is to reduce the transmission rate (ideally by the
same amount as the excess secrecy rate D) so that the actual
transmission rate is below the true average secrecy capacity.
The proposed attack has shown to be effective even when
considering eavesdroppers with the same capabilities as the
legitimate agents, and without the need for using additional
techniques such as jamming, multi-antenna reception or eaves-
dropper collusion. The impact of product channel attacks on
physical layer security in more sophisticated scenarios, and the
design of techniques to detect or mitigate these type of attacks
seem to be interesting directions for future research activities.
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